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Abstract—SWIM is a peer-to-peer group membership protocol
with attractive scaling and robustness properties. However, slow
message processing can cause SWIM to mark healthy members as
failed (so called false positive failure detection), despite inclusion
of a mechanism to avoid this.
We identify the properties of SWIM that lead to the problem,
and propose Lifeguard, a set of extensions to SWIM which
consider that the local failure detector module may be at fault,
via the concept of local health. We evaluate this approach in
a precisely controlled environment and validate it in a real-
world scenario, showing that it drastically reduces the rate of
false positives. The false positive rate and detection time for true
failures can be reduced simultaneously, compared to the baseline
levels of SWIM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Three key issues that any distributed system must address
are discovery, fault detection, and load balancing among its
components. Group membership is an intuitive abstraction
that can be used to address all three issues simultaneously.
Members of a group and its clients are offered a dynamically
updating view of the current group membership, and use this
view to perform actions such as request routing and state
migration.
SWIM [1] is a group membership protocol with a number
of attractive properties. It’s peer-to-peer design and use of
randomized communication make it highly scalable, robust
to both node and network failures, and easy to deploy and
manage. Its simplicity make it easy to implement and debug,
compared to many distributed systems protocols.
We are aware of three mature open source implementations
of SWIM. Butterfly [2] is part of Habitat [3], a popular soft-
ware automation platform. Ringpop [4] was built to support the
applications of a global transportation technology company.
memberlist[5] is our implementation of SWIM, which under-
pins Consul[6], a popular service discovery and management
tool, and Nomad[7], a high-availability, data center scale
scheduler. Through our relationship with customers, we know
of hundreds of thousands of running instances of Consul, and
deployments with more than 6,000 members in a single group.
The SWIM paper identifies sensitivity to slow message
processing as an issue with the basic SWIM protocol. Slow
message processing can be caused by a wide variety of factors,
including CPU contention, network delay or loss, and can lead
SWIM to declare healthy members as faulty - so called false
positive failure detection. To counter this, the SWIM paper
proposes a Suspicion subprotocol, that trades increased failure
detection latency for fewer false positives.
However, our experience supporting Consul and Nomad
shows that, even with the Suspicion subprotocol, slow message
processing can still lead healthy members being marked as
failed in certain circumstances. When the slow processing oc-
curs intermittently, a healthy member can oscillate repeatedly
between being marked as failed and healthy. This ‘flapping’
can be very costly if it induces repeated failover operations,
such as provisioning members or re-balancing data.
Debugging these scenarios led us to insights regarding both
a deficiency in SWIM’s handling of slow message processing,
and a way to address that deficiency. The approach used is
to make each instance of SWIM’s failure detector consider its
own health, which we refer to as local health. We implement
this via a set of extensions to SWIM, which we call Lifeguard.
Lifeguard is able to significatly reduce the false positive rate,
in both controlled and real-world scenarios.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
motivates the advantages of SWIM that lead us to use it,
and the kinds of scenarios where we have encountered this
problem. Section III describes SWIM and memberlist, the
implementation of SWIM that we use to evaluate Lifeguard.
Section IV describes the Lifeguard extensions to SWIM.
Section V describes the experimental evaluation of the compo-
nents of Lifeguard, individually and in combination. Section
VI describes Lifeguard’s relationship to prior work. In Section
VII we discuss the conclusions that can be drawn, and potential
future work.
II. MOTIVATION
SWIM uses randomized probe-based failure detection and
gossip-based update dissemination to obtain a number of
attractive properties:
• Scalability. In SWIM, the expected time to first detection
of a failure, the false positive rate, and the message load
per group member are independent of group size. Time
to fully disseminate a failure grows logarithmically with
group size.
• Robustness. Because the protocol is fully decentralized,
the simultaneous failure or network partition of any
subset of the group members can be tolerated. Even fully
partitioned sub-groups can continue to operate, and will
automatically merge once connectivity is re-established.
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• Ease of deployment and maintenance. The fully de-
centralized nature of the protocol means a prospective
member can contact any current member to join the
group, and no special action has to be taken to keep the
system healthy when a member leaves.
• Simplicity of implementation. The SWIM protocol has
few states and messages. Because it is peer-to-peer, no
special structure, such as leaders or hierarchies, has to
be configured initially or maintained upon membership
change.
The use of gossip-based update dissemination makes SWIM
weakly consistent. That is, different members may have a
different view of the group membership at a given point in
time. In practice, weak consistency is acceptable for many
applications. Where it is not acceptable, as the SWIM paper
points out, strong consistency can be achieved by layering
a consistent view on top of SWIM, that checkpoints the
membership list.1
SWIM’s failure detector sub-protocol is known to be sus-
ceptible to slow processing of its messages, which can result
in false positive failure detections, where healthy members are
incorrectly declared faulty. This is a serious concern, as there
are often costs associated with diverting traffic away from a
member, and with re-integrating it into the system once it is
declared healthy again.
The SWIM paper addresses this issue by adding a Suspi-
cion mechanism, which is explained in detail in Section III.
However, our experience developing and supporting a range
of systems that use SWIM has shown that even with the
Suspicion mechanism, false failure detections can occur at a
problematic rate under conditions sometimes experienced in
data centers. The issue is exacerbated when multiple members
are slow concurrently. Even healthy members may mark other
healthy members as failed, if they are influenced by their
interactions with the slow members.
Scenarios where we have debugged this issue include:
• Web servers that were provisioned for the steady state,
but experience bursts of much heavier traffic.
• Ingress nodes that run firewalls and other edge services
experiencing a sustained Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack, leading to both high network & CPU load.
• Video transcode servers being assigned workloads that
excessively oversubscribe the available CPU.
• Burstable Performance Instances, such as AWS T2 class
and Azure B-Series virtual machines, being assigned
workloads that exhaust their CPU credits, so that they are
throttled by the hypervisor on which they are executing.
In these and other scenarios, the slow processing of SWIM
messages on the affected machines led to healthy machines
in the same membership group falsely being accused of
1This is the approach[8] taken by Consul[6], which uses Raft[9] to
present a strongly consistent view of the group membership it obtains from
memberlist[5]. While this produces a dependency on a quorum of the Raft
servers, the benefits of SWIM described above still apply to the resources
under management, which only need to act as SWIM group members.
failing. We have encountered this on bare metal and virtualized
systems, in private data centers and public cloud environments.
Figure 1 shows the results of an experiment where we
reproduce the characteristics of the video transcode scenario.
We deploy a cluster of 100 single-core (Standard_A1_v2
class) virtual machines into a region of the Microsoft Azure
public cloud. The Consul agent (the daemon that must run
on each node that is to be a member of the SWIM group)
is deployed on all machines. We then run an extreme CPU-
intensive workload on a subset of the machines. In this case we
used the Linux stress tool, configured to run 128 processes,
each of which executes a tight loop of math operations. The
workload is run for 5 minutes. We log all member failure
events raised by Consul during each test, and analyze the logs
after the experiments are over to determine how many false
positive failure detections occur.
The x-axis of Figure 1 shows the number of machines that
have the stress workload running on them, ranging from
1 to 32 machines (where each machine represents 1% of the
cluster). For each number of stressed machines, the y-axis
shows two related metrics:
• Total False Positives. Failure events about healthy mem-
bers (that did not have the stress workload running on
them), that occur at any member, including the members
running the stress workload.
• False Positives at Healthy Members. Failure events that
are not only about healthy nodes, but were reported by
healthy nodes. These are particularly concerning, as both
of the agents involved - the one raising the event and the
one that the event is about - are in fact healthy.
Each metric is shown twice. Once for Consul running unmod-
ified SWIM and again for it running SWIM with Lifeguard.
Figure 1 shows that for SWIM, even a single overloaded
member is sufficient to cause some false positive failure detec-
tion events, and as few as 4 overloaded members (representing
4% of the cluster) is enough to produce hundreds of false
positives at healthy members, with the problem becoming
more severe as the number of stressed members increases.
By contrast, Lifeguard does not produce false positives until
16 machines are stressed concurrently, and false positives at
healthy members until 32 machines are stressed concurrently.
Both are produced at significantly lower levels than with
SWIM.
These problems do not occur frequently. But when they
do, they can be highly disruptive. Investigating a number of
such incidents that had been escalated as high-priority support
requests led to the development of Lifeguard.
III. SWIM AND MEMBERLIST
In this section we first review SWIM, and then describe
memberlist, the implementation of SWIM with which we
evaluate Lifeguard .
A. SWIM
SWIM has two components:
• a Failure Detector, that detects failures of members.
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Fig. 1. False Positives from CPU exhaustion. The total number of false positive failure detection events and the number occurring at healthy members, as
the number of distressed members is varied from 1 to 32. Results are shown for unmodified SWIM and SWIM with Lifeguard.
• a Dissemination Component, that disseminates updates
about members that joined or left the group, or failed.
The failure detector is taken from prior work[10]. It is
fully decentralized, with each group member working asyn-
chronously in rounds of some configurable duration, called
the protocol period. In each protocol period, each member
picks one other member at random to check the health
of, and performs a direct probe by sending that member a
ping message. If an ack message is not received within a
configurable amount of time, the member initiating the check
performs an indirect probe, by choosing k more members and
sending each of them a ping-req message. Receiving the
ping-req message causes each of the k members to send a
ping message to the member under investigation. If any of
them receives an ack in response, it forwards it to the original
probing member. If the original member does not receive any
ack messages from the direct or indirect probe by the end of
the protocol period, the probed member is considered to have
failed the failure detection.
The dissemination component is gossip-based.2 Each update
about a member joining or leaving the group or failing is
shared with one other member λlog(n) times, where n is the
size of the known group and λ is a tunable multiplier. The
updates are piggybacked on the ping, ping-req and ack
messages of the failure detection protocol, so that no additional
messages are sent. The number of updates piggybacked on
each message is limited (to respect any limit on the message
size, such as the MTU of a UDP packet), and updates that have
been shared less times are preferred, to try and progress the
dissemination of all updates in times of high update activity.
In the simplest realization of SWIM, when a member fails
a failure detection check, it is immediately marked as failed,
and the failure is shared with the group via the dissemination
component. However, the SWIM authors themselves observe
false positive failure detections, and cite slow processing
messages as the primary cause. To address this, the SWIM
paper introduces the Suspicion mechanism. It is introduced as
2The SWIM paper tentatively proposes a multicast based dissemination
component, but immediately rejects that approach in favor of the gossip-based
approach.
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an extension, but in practice is a necessary part of SWIM. It
is implemented by all three of the mature SWIM implemen-
tations discussed in Section I.
With Suspicion enabled, a member that fails a failure
detector check goes to an intermediate suspected state, and a
suspect message is gossiped via the dissemination mecha-
nism, to see if the suspicion can be refuted before a suspicion
timeout is reached. Any member that receives a suspect
message also marks the specified member as suspect, and
gossips its suspicion. If a suspicion timeout is reached without
the suspicion being refuted, the suspected member is declared
faulty, by the gossiping of a confirm message. In this way,
the Suspicion mechanism trades increased failure detection
latency for a lower false positive failure detection rate.
A suspicion is refuted by an alive message being gossiped
about the suspected member and reaching all members that
harbor the suspicion before any of them reaches its suspicion
timeout. The SWIM paper describes two mechanisms by
which an alive message may be originated: Either by a
member that harbors a suspicion, after it successfully probes
the suspected member in a round of failure detection, or by
the suspected member itself, after it receives a suspect
or confirm message about itself. However, in practice, the
suspected member must gossip an alive message about itself
for refutation to work.3
The other refinement to the basic protocol that the SWIM
paper makes is to have each member select its fault detector
targets in round-robin fashion from its list of known members,
as opposed to completely at random. Without this, the worst-
case first-detection latency would be unbounded, due to the
(extremely rare) case that selection of fault detector targets
across all members of the group repeatedly fails to select
the faulty member. By probing in round-robin, the worst
case is bounded. However, each member’s list still has a
random order, with new members being inserted at random
positions. Consequently, the expected first detection latency is
unchanged.
B. memberlist
memberlist[5] is an open source implementation of SWIM,
used by tools including Consul[6], Nomad[7], and Serf[11].
memberlist implements all of the features of SWIM described
above. It has the following additional features:
• memberlist’s fault detector uses UDP by default for both
direct and indirect probes. But in parallel to issuing
indirect probes over UDP, it will attempt a direct probe
over TCP. This helps with situations where TCP traffic
is correctly routed, but UDP is not, which is a pathology
sometimes encountered in network configuration.
3suspect, confirm and alive messages carry an incarnation number
for the member they are about, to establish a precedence for competing
messages, and guide the state of the group towards convergence. As section
4.2 of the SWIM paper points out, alive messages only override the
other message types if they have a higher incarnation number, and only the
suspected member can increment its incarnation number. It does so in response
to receiving a gossiped suspect or confirm message about itself.
• memberlist adds an anti-entropy mechanism, by which
each member periodically does a full state sync with
another randomly selected member, over TCP. The push-
pull approach from [12] is taken, with incarnation num-
bers used to reconcile conflicting state about a given
member. This full state sync increases the likelihood that
nodes are fully converged more quickly, at the expense
of more bandwidth usage. It is particularly helpful for
speeding up recovery from a network partition.
• memberlist has a dedicated gossip layer separate from
the failure detection protocol. Like SWIM, memberlist
will piggyback gossip messages (suspect, alive
and confirm4) on to fault detector messages (ping,
ping-req, ack), but it also will periodically send out
gossip messages on their own. This allows the gossip
rate to be tuned independently of the failure detection
rate, and if necessary faster than it, to speed the rate of
convergence.
• memberlist retains the state of failed nodes for a period
of time, so that information about failed nodes can be
passed in a full state sync. This helps the state of the
group converge more quickly.
As these features are typically enabled in deployments of
memberlist, they are all enabled for the evaluation in this
paper. Butterfly [2] and Ringpop [4] implement many of the
same additional features.
IV. LIFEGUARD
While investigating possible solutions to the problems de-
scribed in Section II, we observed that the Suspicion mech-
anism still assumes some timely processing of messages. In
particular, refutation of a suspicion can only succeed if the re-
futing alive message is processed in a timely manner by all
members suspecting that member. Therefore slow processing
by the failure detector module itself is the primary cause of
the false positives that SWIM’s Suspicion mechanism fails to
suppress.
We also observed that missing expected responses could
indicate a member is experiencing slow message processing,
and that an episode of slow message processing at a given
group member is likely to impact multiple of its interactions
with other members in a short period of time. We think of
these as measures of the health of the local failure detector
instance at that member, which we call local health for short.
Based on these insights, we designed Lifeguard: a set of
extensions to SWIM which make it into an adaptive protocol.
Lifeguard uses heuristic measures of local health to let a
member consider when its failure detector might be slow
processing messages, and if so to dynamically adjust its
timeouts to mitigate timeliness issues.
Lifeguard consciously retains the same design as SWIM so
far as possible. It differs from SWIM only in three compo-
nents, that provide its novel behavior:
4In memberlist, the confirm message is renamed to dead, as the name
confirm is ambiguous as to what is being confirmed.
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• Local Health Aware Probe (LHA-Probe) replaces the
probing stage of SWIM’s failure detector, which has a
fixed probe period and timeout, with one where they are
dynamically adjusted, based on that member’s recent fail-
ure detection-related communication with other members.
• Local Health Aware Suspicion (LHA-Suspicion) re-
places the suspicion stage of SWIM’s failure detector,
which has fixed suspicion timeouts, with one that has
dynamic timeouts. The timeout for each new suspicion
starts significantly higher than it would in the fixed case,
but is reduced as independent suspicions about the same
suspected member are processed.
• Buddy System replaces SWIM’s piggyback message
selector with one that prioritizes notifying a suspected
member of the suspicion, to reduce the average time
to refutation, which helps both the Local Health Aware
Probe and Local Health Aware Suspicion components be
even more effective.
These components are described in detail the sections that
follow.
A. Local Health Aware Probe
Local Health Aware Probe (LHA-Probe) replaces the prob-
ing stage of SWIM’s failure detector, which has a fixed probe
period and timeout, with one where they are dynamically
adjusted, based on that member’s recent failure detection-
related communication with other members. Several sources
of feedback are used:
• The number of ack messages that have been received
is compared to the number of ping and ping-req
messages issued. Missing ack messages could be due
to local slowness, especially if there are multiple.
• The need to refute a suspicion against itself indicates
that the member may not have processed recent ping
messages in a timely manner.
• Local Health Aware Probe adds a nack message to the
fault detector protocol, which is sent in the case of failed
indirect probes.5 This gives the member that initiates the
indirect probe a way to check if it is receiving timely
responses from the k members it enlists, even if the target
of their indirect pings is not responsive.
These different sources of feedback are combined in a Local
Health Multiplier (LHM). LHM is a saturating counter, with a
max value S and min value zero, meaning it will not increase
above S or decrease below zero. The following events cause
the specified changes to the LHM counter:
• Successful probe (ping or ping-req with ack): -1
• Failed probe +1
• Refuting a suspect message about self: +1
• Probe with missed nack: +1
5When a member is sent a ping-req message, it will send a nack back
at 80% of the probe timeout unless it receives an ack by that time. An ack
is still forwarded if it is received after the nack has been sent, and a member
receiving a nack followed by an ack within the timeout period considers
this as a successful indirect probe.
The current value of LHM is used to set the probe interval
and timeout as follows:
ProbeInterval = BaseProbeInterval.(LHM(S) + 1)
ProbeT imeout = BaseProbeT imeout.(LHM(S) + 1)
ProbeInterval is the period between attempting a liveness
probe against successive randomly selected peers, and Probe-
Timeout is the timeout on receiving an ack to a given probe. In
the memberlist implementation, we set BaseProbeInterval to 1
second and BaseProbeTimeout to 500 milliseconds. S defaults
to 8, which means the probe interval and timeout will back
off as high as 9 seconds and 4.5 seconds, respectively.
B. Local Health Aware Suspicion
Local Health Aware Suspicion (LHA-Suspicion) replaces
the suspicion stage of SWIM’s failure detector, which has
fixed suspicion timeouts, with one that has dynamic timeouts.
The timeout for each new suspicion starts significantly higher
than it would in the fixed case, but is reduced as independent
suspicions - from other members, but about the same suspected
member - are processed. In this way, the timeout will fall to its
minimum level as long as the local member is receiving and
processing gossip messages in a timely manner. Conversely,
the suspicion timeout will remain high for members that are
not receiving and processing gossip messages in a timely
manner.
The timeout for a given suspicion is calculated as follows:
SuspicionT imeout =
max
(
Min,Max− (Max−Min) log(C + 1)
log(K + 1)
)
where:
• Min and Max are the minimum and maximum Suspicion
timeout. See Section V-C for discussion of their config-
uration.
• K is the number of independent suspicions required to be
received before setting the suspicion timeout to Min. We
default K to 3.
• C is the number of independent suspicions about that
member received since the local suspicion was raised.
The timeout is recalculated whenever a suspect message
is received that represents a previously unseen independent
suspicion about the same member. At that time, the current
suspicion timer is canceled and replaced with one for the
remaining time until the new reduced timeout. If that amount
of time has already passed, the timeout is triggered.
Logarithmic decay is used so that each successive reduction
in the timeout is smaller than the last, as more independent
suspect messages are received. The intuition behind this is
that the first independent message gives the biggest increase
in confidence that messages are being received in a timely
manner, with each subsequent message adding less to the
confidence.
To make independent suspicions more prevalent, when
LHA-Suspicion is enabled the first K independent suspicions
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received about the same member are re-gossiped. Each sus-
picion is sent λlog(n) times, so that if K more suspicions
are received, the maximum number of messages sent is
(K + 1)λlog(n). Without LHA-Suspicion, the independent
suspicions are not re-gossiped, and only the member’s own
suspicion is gossiped, a maximum of λlog(n) times.
C. Buddy System
In SWIM, a suspected member is not guaranteed to hear of
the suspicion at the first opportunity. A suspected node only
learns of the suspicion when it receives a gossiped suspect
message about itself. While gossip messages are piggybacked
on fault detector messages, including ping messages, the
rules governing the dissemination of gossip messages include
a limited number of gossip messages per piggyback, limited
re-sends of each gossip message, and a preference for newer
gossip messages.
Buddy System replaces SWIM’s piggyback message selec-
tor with one that prioritizes notifying a suspected member
of the suspicion. This guarantees that any node that pings a
suspected node (either on its own behalf, or for the indirect
path of another node) will communicate the suspicion as part
of the ping. This can result in refutation starting sooner,
which would be helpful even without the other Lifeguard
components. But it also helps Local Health Aware Probe and
Local Health Aware Suspicion work more effectively.
V. EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Criteria
We evaluate Lifeguard according to the same criteria used
to evaluate SWIM in the original paper (see Section 5 of [1]).
Namely:
• Failure Detection False Positives. Lifeguard sets out to
reduce the number of healthy members that are mistak-
enly marked as failed.
• Detection and Dissemination Latency. Lifeguard should
not increase the time to first detection or full dissemina-
tion of true positive fault detection.
• Message Load. We consider the number of messages and
bytes sent. Lifeguard should either decrease these, or not
increase them by very much.
B. Configurations Tested
The three components of Lifeguard described in Section
?? are evaluated separately and in combination, in order to
understand their relative contribution, and the way they interact
with one another.
Experiments are run for each configuration described in
Table I. The ’SWIM’ configuration gives the performance with
Lifeguard completely disabled. It is the baseline against which
the other combinations are compared. This approach is made
possible by running a modified version of Consul, where each
component can be enabled or disabled independently.
C. Suspicion Timeout Configuration
As described in Section IV-B, Lifeguard’s Local Health
Aware Suspicion component makes use of a Min and Max
Suspicion timeout. In the memberlist implementation, these
are configured as follows:
Min = αlog10(n)ProbeInterval
Max = βMin
where:
• n is the number of members in the known group.
• ProbeInterval is the interval between successive failure
detector probe messages. The default value of 1 second
is used for all experiments.
• α and β are tunable parameters.
To examine the effect of the tunable parameters, each
experiment is repeated nine times, with full Lifeguard (test
configuration Lifeguard) configured with a different com-
bination of α = 2, 4, 5 and β = 2, 4, 6. The performance of the
different combinations is compared with the baseline perfor-
mance of memberlist with Lifeguard completely disabled (test
configuration SWIM), which has a fixed Suspicion timeout,
equivalent to configuring α = 5 and β = 1.
D. Experiments
The SWIM paper correctly identifies that slow message
processing may be due to a number of factors, including CPU
exhaustion, network delay, and packet loss - either at the local
host or in the network. The net result is always failure to
process one or more protocol messages in a timely manner.
For the purpose of this investigation, we induce slow message
processing by pausing the sending and receiving of protocol
messages at selected group members for well defined periods
of time. We call each period of delay at one member an
anomaly.
Two different types of experiment are used to evaluate the
criteria defined in section V-A: Threshold and Interval. They
are described in the subsections that follow. The reason for
two types of experiments is as follows:
• The Threshold experiment introduces a single set of
concurrent anomalies per experiment. This allows the
latency from the start of an anomaly to its detection and
dissemination to be examined, as with only a single set
of anomalies, the causality is clear.
• However, in real-world situations, CPU and network de-
lays can be intermittent, with processes making progress
in small bursts. The Interval experiment explores this
space by introducing anomalies in a cyclic way for the
duration of each experiment. The duration of and interval
between anomalies is varied across a number of different
experiments.
The experiments are performed using deployments of Con-
sul, a service discovery and monitoring system built on top of
memberlist. However, none of the higher-level features of Con-
sul (such as a Raft[9]-based consistent view of the available
services) are employed, and the cluster is deployed without
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Configuration Description
SWIM Regular SWIM
LHA-Probe SWIM + Local Health Aware Probe
LHA-Suspicion SWIM + Local Health Aware Suspicion
Buddy System SWIM + Buddy System
Lifeguard All Lifeguard components enabled
TABLE I
CONFIGURATIONS TESTED.
server instances, so that only the features of memberlist are
exercised.
1) Threshold Experiment: The Threshold experiment is
used to examine the effect of Lifeguard on detection and
dissemination latency. It has the following form:
• 128 Consul agents are started in a single Linux VM,
communicating over the loopback network interface.
• 15 seconds are allowed for the agents to quiesce.
• C instances (selected at random) enter an anomalous state,
where they block immediately before sending or after
receiving any protocol message from another member of
the cluster. 6
• The anomalies continue for a duration D, at the end of
which the blocked sends and receives are unblocked.
• The experiment continues until all 128 Consul instances
return to seeing one another as healthy, or until 120
seconds have passed from the start of the experiment.
Many instances of the Threshold experiment are run for each
configuration tested, sweeping a range of values for C and D.
The values tested are given in Table II. The experiment is run
10 times for each combination of Lifeguard components and
other experiment parameters.
2) Interval Experiment: The Interval experiment is used to
examine the effect of Lifeguard on both false positive failure
detection, and message load. It has the same form as the
Threshold experiment, apart from the following differences:
• At the end of the anomalous period of duration D, each
of the anomalous Consul instances returns to normal
operation for an interval I.
• The cycle of anomalous and normal operation repeats in
rotation, for periods of length D and I respectively, until
at least 120 seconds have passed since the beginning of
the test. The test ends at the end of the next anomalous
period.
Many instances of the Interval experiment are run for each
Lifeguard configuration tested, sweeping a range of values for
C, D and I. The values tested are given in Table III. The
experiment is run 10 times for each combination of Lifeguard
components and other experiment parameters.
6The start and end of the anomaly period are synchronized via the system
clock of the VM, so that the C anomalous instances change state in lock-step.
While many more combinations of start and end time could be examined, this
represents the worst case of C fully correlated anomalies, such as from power
loss to a rack.
E. Experiment Environment
The experiments are run on Microsoft Azure Compute-
Optimized (F-Series) VMs, which are deployed on 2.4 GHz
Intel Xeon E5-2673 v3 (Haswell) processors. F16 instances
are used, which are each allocated 16 cores and 32GiB of
RAM. Ubuntu 16.04 LTS daily build 201701280 is used, and
Consul is configured to write DEBUG-level logs to /dev/shm,
the ramdisk that Ubuntu configures by default. Logs are copied
to SSD at the end of each experiment.
To reduce scheduling and memory access indeterminacy,
8 Consul agents are pinned to each of the 16 CPU cores
and the associated memory bank, using the Linux numactl
tool. CPU usage is monitored throughout the lifetime of each
experiment, by sampling /proc/stat [13] at a 1 second
interval, and it is confirmed that there is spare CPU capacity
in all experiments, indicated by a increase in the aggregate
core idle time at each interval. In practice, 16 cores on this
class of CPU is excessive for 128 Consul agents.
F. Results
The experiments explore a large combinatorial space of
parameter values. To make the results more tractable, we
first examine the performance of Lifeguard with the tunable
Suspicion timeout parameters (described in Section V-C), set
to the highest values considered: α = 5 and β = 6. We then
examine the effect of lowering α and β.
1) Failure Detection False Positives: The Interval exper-
iment, described in Section V-D2, is used to measure the
effect of Lifeguard on the occurrence of failure detection
false positives - that is, of healthy agents mistakenly being
marked as failed. We define a failure detection false positive
as occurring each time an agent failure event is raised about
a Consul agent that is not in the set of agents for which
anomalies have been introduced. Within these false positives,
we distinguish between false positives that occur at any Consul
agent (denoted FP), and those that occur at healthy agents
(denoted FP-). FP- are most concerning, as in this case, both
of the agents involved - the one raising the event and the one
that the event is about - are in fact healthy.
Table IV gives the aggregated false positive statistics for all
Interval experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. The meaning
of each column is as follows:
• Configuration Tested : Combination of Lifeguard
components enabled, as described in Section V-B.
7
Parameter Label Values Tested
Concurrent anomalies C 1, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32
Duration of each anomaly D 128, 512, 2048, 8192, 16384, 32768
TABLE II
THRESHOLD EXPERIMENT PARAMETERS AND VALUES TESTED. DURATIONS ARE GIVEN IN MILLISECONDS.
Parameter Label Values Tested
Concurrent anomalies C 1, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32
Duration of each anomaly D 128, 512, 2048, 8192, 16384, 32768
Interval between anomalies I 1, 4, 16, 64, 256, 1024, 4096, 16384
TABLE III
INTERVAL EXPERIMENT PARAMETERS AND VALUES TESTED. DURATIONS AND INTERVALS ARE GIVEN IN MILLISECONDS.
• FP Events : Total number of false positive failure
events occurring at all Consul agents.
• FP- Events : Number of false positive failure events
occurring at healthy agents (outside of the set that have
anomalies introduced).
• FP % SWIM : FP Events as a percentage of the value
for SWIM (the baseline).
• FP- % SWIM : FP- Events as a percentage of the
value for SWIM (the baseline).
Configuration
Tested
FP
Events
FP-
Events
FP
% SWIM
FP-
% SWIM
SWIM 339002 1326 100.00 100.00
LHA-Probe 229574 436 67.72 32.88
LHA-Suspicion 10174 89 3.00 6.71
Buddy System 318935 591 94.08 44.57
Lifeguard 5193 25 1.53 1.89
TABLE IV
AGGREGATED FALSE POSITIVE RESULTS FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS
WHERE α = 5 AND β = 6. FOR EACH CONFIGURATION TESTED, FP
EVENTS IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FALSE POSITIVE EVENTS, AND FP-
EVENTS IS THE NUMBER OF FALSE POSITIVE EVENTS AT HEALTHY
NODES. FP % SWIM AND FP- % SWIM GIVE THE SAME RESULTS AS THE
PERCENTAGE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE VALUES FOR SWIM.
Table IV shows that false positives are dominated by those
occurring at slow processing members. This is indicated by
FP- being a small proportion of FP, for all configurations
tested, including the baseline with Lifeguard completely dis-
abled (SWIM).
Table IV also shows that the false positive rate is drastically
reduced by the introduction of Lifeguard. All components of
Lifeguard contribute to the reduction, with Local Health Aware
Suspicion (LHA-Suspicion) making the biggest individual
contribution. Combining all of the components (Lifeguard)
has the greatest effect. Both the overall number of false
positives (FP Events) and false positives at healthy nodes
(FP- Events) are reduced to less than 2% of the baseline
levels for SWIM. This represents a more than 50x reduction
in false positives.
The effect of Buddy System (Buddy System) is note-
worthy, since it more than halves the false positives at healthy
members (FP-), but has relatively little effect on the overall
number of false positives (FP). This difference is explained by
considering its method of action - helping a suspected member
become aware of the suspicion in a more timely manner. This
in turn can lead to refutation starting sooner. Healthy members
(responsible for FP-) can receive and process the refutation
in a timely manner, where as members experiencing slow
message processing often can not. Since FP is in general dom-
inated by false positives members experiencing slow message
processing, this leaves it little changed by Buddy System.
The results in Table IV aggregate the false positive event
counts for all tested numbers of concurrent anomalies (C,
as defined in Section V-D1). Figures 2 and 3 consider the
variation in number of false positives with the number of
concurrent anomalies.
Figure 2 shows the total number of false positives (FP
Events) for each number of concurrent anomalies tested. It
shows clearly that the number of false positives rises with the
number of concurrent anomalies, but that at every concurrency
level, full Lifeguard (Lifeguard) reduces the number of
false positives by a factor of between 50x and 100x.
Figure 3 shows the number of false positives at healthy
members (FP- Events) for each number of concurrent
anomalies tested. It is more noisy, compared to Figure 2, due
to these events being much less frequent than false positives in
general. Once again, the number of false positives rises with
the number of concurrent anomalies, and at every concurrency
level, full Lifeguard (Lifeguard) reduces the number of
false positives at healthy members by a factor of between 10x
and 100x. The false positive rate is reduced so much with
Lifeguard fully enabled that at some concurrencies, zero false
positives occurred at healthy nodes during repeated testing.
2) Detection and Dissemination Latency: The Threshold
experiment, described in Section V-D1, is used to measure
the effect of Lifeguard on detection and dissemination latency
for true positive failures.
Table V shows the effect of the different Lifeguard com-
ponents on detection and dissemination latencies across all
experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. The meaning of each
column is as follows:
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Fig. 2. Total false positives (FP Events) versus number of concurrent
anomalies for all experiments where α = 5 and β = 6.
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Fig. 3. False positives at healthy agents (FP- Events) versus number
of concurrent anomalies for all experiments where α = 5 and β = 6.
Configuration
Tested
Median
1st Detect
99th %
1st Detect
99.9th %
1st Detect
Median
Full Dissem
99th %
Full Dissem
99.9th %
Full Dissem
SWIM 12.44 16.96 19.40 12.90 16.93 20.17
LHA-Probe 12.42 17.75 20.10 12.90 17.98 20.56
LHA-Suspicion 12.42 17.47 25.41 12.89 17.33 23.80
Buddy System 12.45 17.12 19.16 12.92 17.18 19.81
Lifeguard 12.45 17.90 21.20 12.91 18.05 21.68
TABLE V
FIRST DETECTION AND FULL DISSEMINATION LATENCIES FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS WHERE α = 5 AND β = 6. ALL TIMES ARE IN SECONDS.
• Configuration Tested : Combination of Lifeguard
components enabled, as defined in Section V-B.
• Median 1st Detect : The median time from the
start of an anomaly to its first detection by one other
agent.
• 99th % 1st Detect : The 99th percentile time from
the start of an anomaly to its first detection by one other
agent.
• 99.9th % 1st Detect : The 99.9th percentile time
from the start of an anomaly to its first detection by one
other agent.
• Median Full Dissem : The median time from the
start of an anomaly to dissemination of the failure to all
healthy agents.
• 99th % Full Dissem : The 99th percentile time
from the start of an anomaly to dissemination of the
failure to all healthy agents.
• 99.9th % Full Dissem : The 99.9th percentile
time from the start of an anomaly to dissemination of
the failure to all healthy agents.
Table V shows that full Lifeguard (Lifeguard) raises the
latencies for first detection and full dissemination by a small
amount. The median increases 0.1 seconds (less than 0.1%)
for both first detection and full dissemination. The increases
in 99th and 99.9th percentile latencies are larger, at around 1
second (6-7%) for first detection and 1.5-1.8 seconds (7-9%)
for 99.9th percentile. Local Health Aware Probe(LHA-Probe)
appears to make the largest contribution to the increase in
99th percentile latencies, while Local Health Aware Suspicion
(LHA-Suspicion) makes the largest contribution to the
increases in 99.9th percentile latencies.
3) Message Load: The Interval experiment, described in
Section V-D2, is used to measure the effect of Lifeguard on
message load. The number of messages and total bytes sent in
each experiment are captured using Consul’s telemetry [14].
Table VI gives the aggregated message load statistics for all
experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. The meaning of each
column is as follows:
• Configuration Tested : The Lifeguard compo-
nents enabled, as defined in Section V-B.
• Msgs Sent(M) : The total number of (compound)
SWIM-related messages sent by all Consul agents, in
millions. Compound messages made by piggybacking
gossip messages on ping-related messages are counted
as one message.
• Bytes Sent(GiB) : The total size of the sent mes-
sages, in gibibytes.
• Msgs % SWIM : Msgs Sent as a percentage of the
value for SWIM (the baseline).
• Bytes % SWIM : Bytes Sent as a percentage of the
value for SWIM (the baseline).
Table VI shows that for experiments with α = 5 and
β = 6, Lifeguard leads to an average increase of around
11% in the number of messages sent, but the amount of data
sent actually decreases by around 2%. Local Health Aware
Suspicion (LHA-Suspicion) is the main contributor to the
increase in both the number of messages and bytes sent.
However, this effect is offset by Local Health Aware Probe
(LHA-Probe), which reduces both the number of messages
and bytes sent.
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Configuration
Tested
Msgs
Sent(M)
Bytes
Sent(GiB)
Msgs
% SWIM
Bytes
% SWIM
SWIM 435.33 149.15 100.00 100.00
LHA-Probe 428.62 134.28 98.46 90.03
LHA-Suspicion 484.55 158.87 111.31 106.52
Buddy System 435.62 147.67 100.07 99.01
Lifeguard 481.42 146.13 110.59 97.97
TABLE VI
AGGREGATED MESSAGE LOAD RESULTS FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS WHERE α = 5 AND β = 6. FOR EACH CONFIGURATION TESTED , MSGS SENT IS
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF (COMPOUND) MESSAGES SENT IN MILLIONS AND BYTES SENT IS THE TOTAL BYTES SENT IN GIBIBYTES. MSGS%SWIM AND
BYTES%SWIM SHOW THE SAME RESULTS AS THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE VALUES FOR THE SWIM BASELINE.
4) Suspicion Timeout Tuning: The results in the previous
sections were obtained with the tunable Suspicion timeout
parameters set to α = 5 and β = 6, which are the highest
values considered. We now examine the effect of lowering α
and β.
Table VII shows the values for the metrics defined in
Sections V-F1 and V-F2, for Lifeguard (Lifeguard) when
configured with different combinations of α and β. The
metrics are shown as a percentage of their baseline values
from running the same set of experiments for SWIM (SWIM).
The following relationships are observed:
• All six latency measures (Med First, Med Full,
99% First, 99% Full, 99.9% First and 99.9%
Full) are positively correlated with α.
• When α = 2, the latency measures (and in particular the
99%, and 99.9% measures) are also positively correlated
with β. The same correlation is not obvious at higher
values of α.
• Total false positives (FP) and false positives at healthy
members (FP-) are negatively correlated with α and β.
As a result, α and β may be used to tune the detection and
dissemination latencies, at the same time as the false positive
rate. Because lower values of α and β improve latency while
making the false positive rate worse, a reduction in detection
latency must be traded for a higher false positive rate.
However, even in the case of the most extreme trade-off
(α = 2 and β = 2), where median detection and dissemination
latency are reduced by around 45% compared to SWIM, the
false positive rate at healthy nodes FP- is still reduced by
68% (a 3x reduction) compared to the SWIM value. At the
other extreme (α = 5 and β = 6), median latencies remain
at their SWIM levels, but false positives are reduced by over
98% (more than 50x), with modest increases in 99th and 99.9th
percentile latencies.
Selecting values for α and β in between these extremes al-
lows the trade-off between reduced latency and false positives
to be tuned, albeit in a coarse-grained manner. We expose α
and β as parameters of Lifeguard.
VI. RELATED WORK
To our knowledge, Lifeguard is the first work to address
SWIM’s sensitivity to slow message processing by the failure
detector module, and possibly the first to address slow mes-
sage processing by the local failure detector module of any
distributed failure detector system.
We consider Lifeguard’s relationship to both the literature
of adaptive failure detectors and adaptive gossip protocols.
We restrict the discussion to unreliable failure detection,
since protocol with strong membership guarantees to not
have the scaling characteristics required in the datacenter-scale
setting[15].
Chandra and Toueg [16] introduce the concept of unreliable
failure detectors, which is the category that encompasses
SWIM, Lifeguard and most failure detectors deployed on com-
modity hardware. They identify completeness and accuracy
as key properties for evaluating unreliable failure detectors.
However, their focus is on understanding the conditions under
which unreliable failure detectors can be used to build a
reliable, distributed consensus protocol (or equivalently, an
atomic broadcast protocol). Consequently, they only reason
about failure detectors abstractly, and do not explore how a
detector might be made more reliable.
Chen et al. [17][18] observe that [16] only offers eventual
guarantees, with no timing assumptions. To address this, they
introduce quality of service (QoS) for failure detectors, and
identify detection latency as a critical property in many use
cases. They propose an adaptive failure detector that, like
Lifeguard, adjusts its timeouts based on recent observations
about message loss and delay. But unlike Lifeguard, there is
no consideration of whether the local failure detector might be
running slowly, and hence a slow detector could report false
positives about the peer member it is monitoring.
Bertier et al. [19] refine [17] with a better estimate of
network latency, resulting in lower average detection time.
Hayashibara et al. [20] make a more significant modification
to [17], and introduce accrual failure detectors, which replace
the traditional boolean detector output with a suspicion value
on a continuous scale. This allows applications to make more
nuanced decisions about the health of a monitored member.
Satzger et al. [21] make the accrual detector more compu-
tationally efficient and remove the assumption of normally
distributed arrival times. Most recently, Liu et al. [22] argue
for a specific arrival time distribution that is better suited to
the message delays seen in cloud environments. However, once
again, none of these designs consider whether the local failure
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α = 2
β = 2
α = 2
β = 4
α = 2
β = 6
α = 4
β = 2
α = 4
β = 4
α = 4
β = 6
α = 5
β = 2
α = 5
β = 4
α = 5
β = 6
Med First 53.14 54.10 54.34 82.96 83.04 83.12 99.76 99.52 100.08
Med Full 55.12 56.28 56.74 84.42 84.03 84.42 99.92 99.61 100.08
99% First 69.81 72.88 75.53 94.28 96.17 96.82 104.95 102.71 105.54
99% Full 73.07 76.96 79.15 97.05 96.69 96.52 105.73 105.08 106.62
99.9% First 76.08 75.41 80.36 99.07 93.71 94.69 112.32 111.44 109.28
99.9% Full 76.20 75.11 78.58 92.17 95.14 92.71 107.64 107.93 107.49
FP 98.37 43.64 24.16 37.72 8.04 3.18 26.61 5.43 1.53
FP- 31.15 22.47 13.65 20.29 9.50 4.83 15.38 5.05 1.89
TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE AS PERCENTAGE OF SWIM BASELINE WITH DIFFERENT TUNINGS OF α AND β . EACH COLUMN SHOWS METRICS FOR LIFEGUARD
CONFIGURED WITH THE GIVEN VALUES OF α AND β . THE METRICS ARE THOSE DEFINED IN SECTIONS V-F1 AND V-F2, SHOWN AS A PERCENTAGE OF
THEIR BASELINE VALUES FOR SWIM (SWIM).
detector is running slowly, and hence they all have the same
potential as [17] for a slow running detector to make false
positive reports about a healthy peer that it is monitoring.
All of the above work is heartbeat-based. We observe that
there is nothing inherent to heartbeats that prohibits modeling
of the local detector’s timeliness. However all of these works
focus on the operation of a single failure detector in a 1-
to-1 monitoring relationship with a single peer, which means
the Lifeguard heuristics can not be applied directly. In the
setting of multiple co-located heartbeat-based detectors (each
receiving messages from a different peer), it would be possible
to evaluate applying the Lifeguard heuristics. We return to this
point in Section VII.
Gupta et al. [23] introduce adaptivity into the gossip liter-
ature. Like Lifeguard, their adaptive scheme leverages local
knowledge about peer failure and message loss, and uses it to
take remedial action (in their case to transition to a different
dissemination sub-protocol). However, unlike Lifeguard, there
is no consideration of slowness, either of message delivery or
members themselves. Additionally, the metrics evaluated are
instantaneous, rather than accumulated over a period of time,
and do not take into account correlation across different peers.
A number of other adaptive gossip protocols are similar to
Lifeguard in that they adjust the sending of messages, based on
the local member’s interaction with its peers. Levis et al. [24]
and Gobriel et al. [25] delay forwarding messages, while Haas
et al. [26][27] and Kyasanur et al. [28] vary the probability
of forwarding a message. Bhandari and Gupta [29] vary both
forwarding delay and probability. However, these protocols all
target Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), and their adaptive
behavior is concerned with eliminating unnecessary messages.
They adapt passively to member failures, and do not use probe-
based failure detection or offer timeliness guarantees. Hence
they have no need to model slow message processing.
Johansen et al. [30] propose an adaptive gossip-based proto-
col that is similar to Lifeguard in many respects. Like SWIM
and hence Lifeguard, it is a general purpose group membership
protocol, which uses probe-based failure detection. It has
a suspicion phase and gossip based update dissemination
sub-protocol. Like Lifeguard, it adaptively tunes the probe
timeouts, but it is more granular, with an independent tuning
for each peer that is probed. (This is possible because the set
of probe targets is based on membership in the same pseudo-
random ring, and hence is very small and stable compared to
that of SWIM and Lifeguard, which round robin through all
known peers.) However, unlike Lifeguard, the suspicion time-
out it not adaptively tuned. More significantly, the probe tuning
does not consider the possibility of slow message processing
at the local failure detector. In fact, the assumption that all
correct (meaning non-Byzantine and non-failed) members can
run their probe and update dissemination sub-protocols in a
timely manner is explicitly state (in section 4.1). The adaptive
tuning is present only to accommodate unreliable message
delivery.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our goal with Lifeguard was to reduce the rate of false
positive failures compared to that of SWIM, while minimally
impacting latencies and message load. Across a wide range
of cases tested, Lifeguard achieves this, with reductions in
false positives in the range of 10x to 100x, and over 50x
on average. The false positive rate is reduced so much that
at some levels of concurrent anomalies, zero false positives
occurred at healthy nodes during repeated testing. This is
achieved with negligible increase in median detection and
dissemination latencies, and modest (6-9%) increase in 99
and 99.9th percentile latencies. On average, around 12% more
messages are sent, but the total bytes sent actually falls around
2%.
Additionally, through tuning of the timeouts used by Life-
guard’s Local Health Aware Suspicion component, some of
the reduction in false positives can be traded for a reduction
in latencies. But even in the case of the most extreme trade-off
tested, where median detection and dissemination latency are
reduced by 45% (close to 2x), the false positive rate at healthy
nodes is still reduced by 68% (3x), compared with SWIM.
All measures of detection and dissemination latency are
reduced by the tuning, however the gap between median
and 99th percentile latencies widens as the median latency
is decreased. This is not surprising, given that Lifeguard’s
selection of peers to communicate with, like SWIM’s, is
randomized and has no coordination between members. Future
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work could explore ways to more tightly bound detection and
dissemination latencies. Adding a random overlay network is
one possible approach, and in particular we look to [31] for
inspiration.
Lifeguard has several parameters that currently use heuris-
tically determined values. These include Local Health Aware
Suspicion’s re-gossip factor (K), the saturation limit of the
LHM counter (S) and the scores given to the different events
that affect the LHM counter. Future work could explore auto-
matic tuning of these parameters, with one possible approach
being to find (or learn) metrics that allow these parameters to
be adaptively tuned via feedback.
In developing Lifeguard, we have devised heuristics that
take advantage of the randomized patterns of communication
that Lifeguard inherits from SWIM. Future work could replace
Lifeguard’s heuristics with a formal model or new heuristics
derived from a model as in [31], or from a utility function,
as in [32]. A separate line of work could investigate applying
the local health approach to other classes of failure detector.
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